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Abstract: The code of Hammurabi specified a “trial by surviving in the river” as a way 
of deciding whether an accusation was true. This system is puzzling for two reasons. 
First, it is based on a superstition: We do not believe that the guilty are any more likely to 
drown than the innocent. Second, if people can be easily persuaded to hold a superstitious 
belief, why such an elaborate mechanism? Why not simply assert that those who are 
guilty will be struck dead by lightning? We attack these puzzles from the perspective of 
the theory of learning in games. We give a partial characterization of patiently stable 
outcomes that arise as the limit of steady states with rational learning as players become 
more patient. These “subgame-confirmed Nash equilibria” have self-confirming beliefs at 
certain information sets reachable by a single deviation. We analyze this refinement and 
use it as a tool to study the broader issue of the survival of superstition. According to this 
theory Hammurabi had it exactly right: his law uses the greatest amount of superstition 
consistent with patient rational learning. 
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  The first known written record of a mechanism is the code of Hammurabi. The 
second of Hammurabi’s laws is “If any one bring an accusation against a man, and the 
accused go to the river and leap into the river, if he sink in the river his accuser shall take 
possession of his house. But if the river prove that the accused is not guilty, and he 
escape unhurt, then he who had brought the accusation shall be put to death, while he 
who leaped into the river shall take possession of the house that had belonged to his 
accuser.” This law is puzzling for two reasons.  First, it is based on the superstition that 
the  guilty  are  more  likely  to  drown  than  the  innocent.  Second,  if  people  are  this 
superstitious, why use such an elaborate mechanism? Why not simply assert that those 
who are guilty will be struck dead by lightning, while the innocent will not be? If this is 
believed, it will be as effective at preventing crime as the Hammurabi mechanism, and it 
does not require witnesses or judges or any of the other complicated and costly elements 
of the Hammurabi code. 
  Our  perspective  on  these  puzzles  is  that  of  the  theory  of  rational  Bayesian 
learning in extensive-form games.
3 We argue that Hammurabi had it exactly right: his 
law  uses  the  greatest  amount  of  superstition  consistent  with  patient  rational  learning. 
Using a model we developed in [1993b], we imagine society to consist of overlapping 
generations of finitely lived players. These players are indoctrinated into the social norm 
as children – for example “if you commit a crime you will be struck by lightning” – and 
enter the world as young adults with prior beliefs that it is very likely that the social norm 
is true. However, the players are rational Bayesians, and are relatively patient, so when 
they are young they optimally decide to commit a few crimes to see what will happen. In 
the case of the lightning-strike norm, most young players will discover that the chances 
of being struck by lightning are independent of whether they commit crimes, and so go 
on  to  a  life  of  crime,  thereby  undermining  the  norm.  The  Hammurabi  case  is  more 
complex: the social norm is to not commit crimes and to only accuse the guilty.  If older 
people adhere to this norm, what happens? Young potential criminals commit crimes, are 
accused of crimes,  and are punished, so they learn that crime does not pay, and as they 
grow older stop committing crimes. But what about the young accusers? The critical fact 
                                                 
3 We discuss some of the related literature in the conclusion.  
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is that the accusers only get to play the game after a crime takes place. As we have 
described the situation, there are few crimes, hence accusers only get to play infrequently. 
Infrequent play reduces the value of experimentation, because there will likely be a long 
delay before the knowledge gained can be put to use. We show that even young accusers 
will not experiment with false accusations, and so they will never learn that the river is as 
likely to punish the innocent as the guilty.   
To  formalize  this  intuition,  we  consider  the  limit  of  the  steady  states  of  this 
learning model, as first the length of life becomes infinite, and then the discount factor 
approaches one; we call these the “patiently stable states.”  Our [1993b] paper showed 
that these limits are necessarily  Nash equilibria, but being a Nash  equilibrium is not 
sufficient for patient stability.  The present paper’s technical contribution is to refine this 
conclusion, providing a more restrictive necessary condition for patient stability that is 
also sufficient in the stylized “accusation game” that we use to illustrate the Hammurabi 
mechanism.  Specifically,  we  show  that,  for  the  appropriate  choice  of  priors,  the 
Hammurabi mechanism does describe a patiently stable outcome of this game, but that 
the “lightning-strike” mechanism does not.  
To see the impact of patient stability, consider a game with a single potential 
criminal and a single accuser. Player 1 moves first and may  either exit or commit a 
crime.  If player 1 exits the game ends; if he chooses crime, player 2 gets to move, and 
may either tell the truth or lie. Both players get 0 if there is exit. If a crime is committed, 
and player 2 tells the truth, player 1 receives a very low payoff, so that regardless of 
player 2’s payoff function, it is a Nash equilibrium for player 1 to exit and player 2 to tell 
the truth.
4 We show that in patient stability requires that players act rationally one step off 
of  the  equilibrium  path;  if  accusers  have  grudges  against  individuals  other  than  the 
criminal, the Nash equilibrium in which they tell the truth will fail this additional test. 
This test is useful also for dealing with a broader set of issues concerning off-path play. 
For example, there may be several players playing in the subgame following a crime. 
Patient stability requires that they learn each other’s behavior, at least to the extent of 
self-confirming equilibrium.  
                                                 
4 Of course this outcome is not subgame perfect, but we will show that subgame perfection is not necessary 
for patient stability Past work had suggested that this is the case, see the discussions in Fudenberg and 
Kreps [1994] and Fudenberg and Levine [1999].  
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To address the question of whether the Hammurabi mechanism is patiently stable, 
we give for the first time a sufficient condition for patient stability: at each subgame 
reachable from the equilibrium path by a single deviation, play in that game must be a 
self-confirming equilibrium in the sense of our [1993a] paper. In particular, we show that 
the Hammurabi equilibrium satisfies this condition. In future work we expect to be able 
to show that for a broader class of games this condition is also necessary for patient 
stability. To complete our analysis of the Hammurabi games, we give a weaker necessary 
condition that fails in the “lightning strike” game.  
2. The Hammurabi Games 
Example 2.1: The Hammurabi Game 
The Hammurabi game has two players, a suspect and an accuser. The suspect, 
player 1, moves first and may either exit or commit a crime. If the suspect exits the game 
ends. If the suspect chooses crime, the accuser, player 2, gets to move, and may either 
tell the truth or lie. 
  Both players get 0 if there is exit. If a crime is committed, and the accuser tells 
the truth, the suspect is thrown in the river, resulting in the suspect being punished with 
probability ￿ and the accuser with probability ￿ ￿ ￿ . If the accuser lies a falsely accused 
third party not explicitly represented in the game is thrown in the river and the accuser is 
punished with probability 1 p - .  
If the crime is committed the payoffs depend on whether the accuser tells the 
truth and whether he is punished. 
 
  Accuser not punished  Accuser punished 
truth  , B P C - -   , B C P - -  
lie  , B B C -   , B B C P - -  
 
Here we interpret C  as the social cost of the crime, which to keep the game simple, we 
have borne by the accuser. To avoid excess notation, we take the benefit to the accuser of 
a false accusation, or lie,  B  to be the same as the benefit of the crime to the suspect, and 
the cost of punishment  P  to be the same for both. We assume that  ￿ ￿￿ ￿  so that the  
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true probability  of punishment is sufficient to deter crime.  Note that as long as the 
probability that the accused drowns is independent of guilt, it is optimal for player 2 to 
lie. 
  The game is illustrated in the extensive form below. 
 
 
Example 2.2: The Hammurabi Game Without a River 
In the Hammurabi game without a river is similar to the Hammurabi game, but 
there is no river. The suspect is always punished if the accuser tells the truth, and the 
accuser is never punished.  
Example 2.3: The Lightning Game 
In  the  lightning  game  there  is  no  accuser,  and  the  suspect  is  punished  with 






































we assume that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
 
  Each  of  these  three  games  has  a  configuration  where  crimes  are  always 
committed, and a configuration in which there is no crime. The no-crime configuration in 
the Hammurabi game is for the accuser to tell the truth, because he believes that if he 
lies he will be punished with probability 1. In the Hammurabi game without a river, no 
crime occurs when the accuser tells the truth; this is weakly optimal for the accuser 
because he is indifferent. In the lightning game, crime is deterred if everyone believes 
that if they commit a crime they will be punished with probability 1, and that if they exit 
they  will  be  punished  with  probability  ￿.    Our  results  will  imply  that  only  the 
Hammurabi game with a river has a patiently stable state with no crime 
3. Simple Games 
This paper focuses on a special class of games where there is a straightforward 
necessary and sufficient condition for social stability. A simple game is a game of perfect 
information (each information set is a singleton node) in which each player has at most 
one  information  set  on  each  path  through  the  tree.  He  may  have  more  than  one 
information set, but once he has moved, he never gets to move again. The Hammurabi 
game with and without a river and the lightning game are simple games.  
   To begin we specify some notation. There are  ￿ ￿ ￿  players in the game, where 
player  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is nature. The game tree ￿  with nodes ￿ ￿ ￿  is finite. The terminal 
nodes are ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Nodes are partially ordered by precedence, so if ￿  follows  ￿ ￿  we 
write  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Since information sets are singleton nodes, we also use  ￿  to denote the 
information sets. Information sets where player ￿ has the move are denoted by  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 
while  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  are the information sets for other players (or nature). The feasible 
actions  at  information  sets  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   are  denoted  ￿￿ ￿￿ .  The  initial  information  set  is 
denoted by  ￿ ￿ ￿ . A pure strategy for player ￿,  ￿ ￿ , is an action at each information set 
in  ￿ ￿ ,  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ;  ￿ ￿  is the set of all such strategies. We let  ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote a 
pure  strategy  profile  for  all  players  including  nature,  and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Each 
strategy profile determines a terminal node  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . We suppose that all players know 
the structure of the extensive form – that is, the game tree  ￿  and action sets  ￿￿ ￿￿ . 
Hence, each player knows the space ￿  of strategy profiles and can compute the function  
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￿ . Each player ￿ receives a payoff in the stage game that depends on the terminal node. 
Player  ￿ ￿ ￿   payoff  function  is  denoted  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿.  We  let 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote the largest difference in utility levels. 
Let  ￿ ￿ ￿￿  denote the space of probability distributions over a set. Then a mixed 
strategy profile is  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ . In addition to mixed strategies, we define behavior 
strategies.  A  behavior  strategy  for  play  ￿,  ￿ ￿ ,  assigns  information  sets  in  ￿ ￿   a 
probability distribution over feasible actions,  ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ;  ￿ ￿ is the set of all such 
strategies.    Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿   be  the  subset  of  terminal  nodes  that  are  reachable  when  ￿ ￿   is 
played, that is  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  if and only if for some  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Similarly, define 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  to be all nodes that are reachable under  ￿ ￿ . We may extend this definition to mixed 
strategies  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   by  requiring  that  the  nodes  or  information  sets  be  reachable  with 
positive probability. We will also need to refer to the information sets that are reached 
with positive probability under ￿ , denoted  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . 
  We now model the idea that each player has beliefs about his opponents’ play 
(including the play of Nature.) Let  ￿ ￿  be a probability measure over  ￿ ￿ ￿ , the set of other 
players’ behavior strategies. Throughout this paper we make the assumption that beliefs 
are independent, that is, that players do not believe that there is a correlation between 
how an opponent plays at different information sets, or how different opponents play.
5  In 
other words,  
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
For a fixed  ￿ ￿ , the marginal probability of a node  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is determined by the beliefs 
i m :    
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
The support of this distribution is the set  ( , ) i i X s m . The distribution  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  gives rise 
to generates a utility function on strategies:  
 
￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
                                                 
5  This  means  that  what  we  call  self-confirming  equilibrium  is  independent  self-confirming  in  the 
terminology of our [1993a] paper.  
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Frequently  ￿ ￿   is  has  a  continuous  density  ￿ ￿   over  ￿ ￿￿ .  In  this  case  we  write 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and  ( , ) i i X s g . 
.    Since each player moves at most once along any path of play, there is a unique 
behavior strategy profile  ￿  associated with any mixed strategy profile  s  by Kuhn’s 
Theorem. 
6  We say that player ￿’s belief  ￿ ￿  is correct at an opponent j’s information set 
￿  if  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . In our learning model, are many agents in the role of 
each player, and each agent will play a pure strategy, so that a state of the system will be 
a vector of probability distributions  1 1 ( ,... , ) I I q q q q + = , where each  i q  is a distribution 
over the pure strategies of player i, and  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is the exogenous distribution over 
Nature’s move.  Henceforth we will use q  to stand for mixed strategy profiles.  
4. Subgame Confirmed Nash Equilibrium 
We turn next to concepts of equilibrium. Our first notion of equilibrium is that of 
self-confirming equilibrium – this imposes the minimal restriction that players should 
learn what happens on the equilibrium path.  
Definition 4.1: ￿  is a  self-confirming equilibrium if  for each player ￿ and for each  ￿ ￿  
with  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  there are beliefs  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  such that  
(a)  ￿ ￿  is a best response to  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and  
(b)  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is correct at every  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ , 
It is important to note that this definition allows player  ￿ to rationalize each  ￿ ￿  in the 
support of  ￿ ￿  with a different beliefs.   This is because in the steady states of our learning 
model, there will be many agents in the role of each player, and different agents may hold 
different beliefs.  Note also that Nash equilibrium differs by strengthening (b) to hold at 
all information sets. Finally, note that self-confirming equilibrium allows players to have 
any beliefs about opponent’s play that are not contradicted by their observations.  The 
“rationalizable  self-confirming  equilibrium”  of  Dekel,  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [1999] 
strengthens this concept by restricting attention to beliefs that are consistent with almost 
common knowledge of the payoff functions.
7 
                                                 
6 Note that because we restrict attention to simple games, the usual issue of defining player i’s conditional 
play at an information set that player i’s own strategy makes unreachable does not arise. 
7 See also Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1994].  
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  We strengthen Nash equilibrium through the refinement of subgame-confirmed 
Nash equilibrium. This requires self-confirming equilibrium in subgames one-step off the 
equilibrium  path.  As  we  will  show  it  corresponds  to  the  steady  states  of  learning 
procedures in which rational Bayesian players experiment with off-path play. 
Definition  4.2:  In  a  simple  game,  node  x  is  one  step  off  the  path  of  p   if  it  is  an 
immediate successor of a node that is reached with positive probability under p . Profile 
p   is a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium and if, in each 
subgame beginning one step off the path, the restriction of  p  to the subgame is self-
confirming in that subgame.  
  Before turning to the model of steady state learning, we first illustrate the notion 
of subgame-confirmed equilibrium through some simple examples. First, it is interesting 
to contrast subgame-confirming with subgame perfection. In a simple game with no more 
than two consecutive moves, self-confirming equilibrium for any player moving second 
implies  optimal  play  by  that  player,  so  subgame-confirmed  Nash  equilibrium  implies 
subgame  perfection.  The  next  example  shows  how  this  fails  when  there  are  three 
consecutive moves. 
Example 4.1: The Three Player Centipede Game 
Three players move in order. If a player drops the game ends, if he passes the 
next player gets to move. Payoff are given in the diagram below: basically everyone 
prefers to pass if he thinks the next player is going do so, and drop if he thinks the next 















The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is clearly for all players to pass. However we 
claim that (drop, drop, pass) is subgame-confirmed.   It is obviously a Nash equilibrium,  
since player 1 is playing a best response to player 2’s strategy of dropping. We must also 
have that drop, pass is self-confirming in the subgame beginning with player 2’s move. 
It is, since if player 2 drops, he does not see player 3’s move, and so may believe that 
player 3 is dropping, even though this is incorrect. The point is that subgame perfection 
requires  beliefs  to  be  correct  in  all  subgames;  subgame-confirmed  Nash  equilibrium 
requires them only to be correct on the path of the subgame that starts one step from the 
equilibrium path. 
  The  next  example  shows  that  subgame-confirmed  Nash  equilibrium  is  not 
equivalent to the requirement that the profile yield a Nash equilibrium at every node that 
is one step off of the path.
8 
Example 4.2 The Four-player Centipede Game 
  Each of four players may either drop out, or pass the move to the next player, 
with payoffs shown in the diagram below. The red lines indicate the equilibrium we 
propose to study. 
                                                 
8 The “k-step perfection” of Kalai and Neme [1992] imposes Nash equilibrium at all nodes k or fewer steps 




Inspection of the game shows that in a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium in which 
player 1 drops out, player 3 must randomize, so in particular the equilibrium above, in 
which player 3 randomizes 50-50, is not path equivalent to a pure strategy subgame-
confirmed Nash equilibrium, and that it is also not path equivalent to an equilibrium with 
Nash play at all nodes at most one step off of the path of play. In particular, the self-
confirming equilibria of the subgame starting with player 2’s move that are consistent 
with player 1 dropping require player 3 to randomize.  
The heart of this example is that there is a conflict between player 1’s and player 
2’s  incentive  constraints,  so  that  for  them  both  to  play  as  specified,  player  3  must 
randomize. Yet in a Nash equilibrium of the subgame starting with 2’s move, if player 2  
passes and player 3 randomizes, player 4 must pass,  so 3 must pass  with probability 1.
9 
 5. Rational Steady-State Learning 
The Agent’s Decision Problem: We now consider an “agent” in the role of player 
i.  This agent expects to play the game ￿  times and wishes to maximize 
                                                 
9 This is a counterexample to a claim made in Fudenberg and Levine [1997] that in games of perfect 
information  self-confirming  equilibria  are  public  randomizations  over  Nash  equilibrium.  It  is  true  for 
games where no path through the tree hits more than two information sets, as we prove in the process of 



































￿ ￿  
where  ￿ ￿  is the realized stage game payoff at ￿  and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
The agent believes that he faces a fixed time invariant probability distribution of 
opponents’ strategies, but is unsure what the true distribution is.  This belief will be 
correct in the steady states we analyze, and approximately correct in the neighborhood of 
a stable steady state.
10 
Definition 5.1: Beliefs  ￿ ￿  are non-doctrinaire if  ￿ ￿  is given by a continuous density 
function  ￿ ￿  strictly positive at interior points. 
Note that this definition allows priors to go to zero on the boundary.
11 
Player  ￿ is assumed to have a prior  ￿
￿ ￿  that is non-doctrinaire and independent.  
The assumption of independence makes updating beliefs very simple: We let  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
denote the posteriors starting with prior  ￿ ￿  after ￿  is observed: 
 
  ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
It is straightforward to show that non-doctrinaire priors imply non-doctrinaire posteriors.   
 
Optimal Play in the Agent’s Decision Problem: The agent observes only his own play 
and the terminal nodes in games that he has played; the private history of the agent 
through time  ￿  is a sequence  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Let  ￿ ￿  be the set of all such 
histories with length no more than ￿ , and  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote the length of history  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
There is also a null history ￿. 
  Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the posterior density over opponent’s strategies given sample  ￿ ￿ , 
and  let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   be  the  corresponding  distribution  over  terminal  nodes.  Let  ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
denote the maximized average discounted value (in current units) starting at  ￿ ￿  with ￿  
periods remaining. Bellman’s equation is 
                                                 
10A model of out-of-equilibrium learning must allow the players beliefs to be systematically wrong, as the 
only way to avoid this is to assume that play in the overall system corresponds to an equilibrium. (Aumann 
[1987].)  Thus the issue is not whether the beliefs are always correct, but whether we should expect the 
agents to detect the errors, which depends on the cost of the error and the difficulty of detecting it  
11 We use this definition, as opposed to the stronger version with densities that are uniformly bounded away 
from zero, because posterior beliefs will typically assign probability 0 to distributions that are inconsistent 









￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿  
where  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Let  ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote a solution of this 
problem.  It will be convenient to abbreviate  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  as  ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  as 
￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  as  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
  An optimal policy is a map  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  defined by 
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Notice that there can be more than one optimal policy; for example several strategies may 
be strategically equivalent. Note also that there will always be an optimal policy that it 
deterministic.  The  combined  assumptions  of  independent  beliefs  and  simple  games 
makes each of an agent’s actions correspond to an independent “bandit problem,” in the 
sense that using a given action provides no information about what would have happened 
had an alternative action been chosen.
12   
   
Steady  States  in  an  Overlapping  Generations  Model:  We  suppose  that  there  is  a 
continuum population, with a unit mass of agents in the role of each player. There is a 
doubly infinite sequence of periods; generations overlap, so there are  ￿￿ ￿  players in 
each generation, with ￿￿ ￿  new players entering each population each period to replace 
the  ￿￿ ￿  player who leave. Every period, each agent is randomly and independently 
matched with one agent from each of the other populations. In particular, the probability 
of meeting an agent of a particular age is equal to its population fraction ￿￿ ￿ ; agents do 
not observe the ages or past experiences of their opponents. 
  We assume (by subdividing populations and adding player roles to the game if 
necessary) that each population has a common prior, and uses a common deterministic 
optimal rule  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Suppose we are given the fractions of each population  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  of each 
population that play the corresponding  i s . Using the rule  ￿  we may then work out the 
fractions  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  of the population with each experience  ￿ ￿ . The new entrants have no 
experience, so  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . We then calculate iteratively for each ( , ( ), ) i i i y r y z  
 
￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿




￿ ￿ ￿ .    (*) 
                                                 
12 Even with independent beliefs this property need not hold when an agent has several actions that lead to 
the same information set of an opponent.  
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Denote the resulting distribution over histories as  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  We can 
then compute the population fractions playing each strategy:  
 
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿  
This is a polynomial map from the space  ￿ of mixed strategy profiles to itself, and so 
has a fixed point. These fixed points are the steady states of the system.
13 
 
Patient Stability: For each non-doctrinaire prior 
0 g , discount factor  ￿ ￿ ￿  and length of 
life ￿  there are optimal rules, and steady states with respect to those rules 
0 ( , ) g T d Q , . If  
there is  a sequence 
0 ( , , )
T g T q d ÎQ ,  lim
T
T q q ®¥ ®  we say that q  is a  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ -stable 
state. If  ( ) q d  are  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ -stable states and  1 lim ( ) d q d q ® ® , we say that q  is a patiently 
stable state.   
We will say that two profiles  , q q¢ are path equivalent if they induce the same 
distribution over terminal nodes.  
Theorem 5.1:  (Fudenberg and Levine [1993b]) 
0, g d -steady states are self-confirming 
equilibria; patiently stable states are Nash equilibria.
14 
  Note  that  the  definitions  of  stability  and  patient  stability  are  satisfied  if  there 
exists a non-doctrinaire prior such that the relevant conditions are satisfied. In general, 
we expect the set of steady states to depend on the prior, and Theorem 5.1 does not assert 
that there is a single prior for which all of the Nash equilibria are steady states. 
                                                 
13 If we consider steady states of the deterministic dynamical system whose state is the fraction of agents 
with each history, the strategy frequencies in those steady states correspond to steady states as defined here. 
In our earlier work [1993b] we defined steady states in the larger space of fraction of agents with each 
history.  However,  it  is  technically  easier  to  deal  with  steady  states  in  the  smaller  space  of  strategy 
frequencies,  since  this  space  does  not  change  as  we  vary  the  length  of  life.  The  two  definitions  are 
equivalent: given population fractions with each history and the optimal rule, we can easily compute the 
unique strategy frequencies; given the strategy frequencies and the optimal rules, we can work the optimal 
strategies forward to uniquely find the steady state population fractions with each history as shown in (*). 
14 Our 1993 paper states this result for the case where agents know the distribution of Nature’s move, but 
the result extends to the present setting. The key fact is that our argument showed that in patiently stable 




6. Patient Stability in Simple Games 
This section presents our main results, and uses them to analyze the Hammurabi 
games that were presented in Section 2.  The main result of this paper is loosely speaking 
that in simple games, a subgame-confirmed equilibrium is path-equivalent to a patiently 
stable steady state.  To prove this, we must first rule out some types of weakly dominated 
strategy. The problem is illustrated by a simple two-player game “niceness” game. 
Example 6.1 The Niceness Game 
  Player 1 moves first, either exit or in. If he exits both players get zero. If he plays 
in, player 2 can be nice or mean. Player 2 gets zero either way, but if he is mean player 1 
gets zero, while if he is nice, player 1 gets one.  
It is a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium, indeed subgame perfect, for player 1 
to play in, and player 2 to play mean.  But player 1 knows his payoff to exit is zero, and 
with non-doctrinaire priors, his posterior is non-doctrinaire, so he has a positive expected 
payoff relative to his posterior by playing in. So in any steady state he must play in, 
which  shows  that  the  being  subgame-confirmed  is  not  always  sufficient  for  patient 
stability. 
 
   This problem can be avoided assuming that there are no ties in payoffs, but this 
would rule out the Hammurabi game with a river, since the suspect only cares whether he 
is punished or not, and there are a number of ways he may fail to be punished. A weaker 
assumption is to assume that no player has two different actions at an information set that 











with respect to Nature’s play. That is, we may convert a game with Nature’s moves into a 
game without Nature’s moves by moving all of Nature’s moves to the end of the game 
and then replacing Nature’s moves with a terminal node assigning the expected utility 
generated by Nature.  In this game as well, no player should have two different actions at 
an information set that can possibly result in a tie in his own payoff. Notice that the first 
condition is satisfied for generic assignments of payoff vectors to terminal nodes, and that 
in a game in which the first condition is satisfied, the second is satisfied for generic 
assignments  of  probabilities  to  Nature.  We  refer  to  such  games  that  satisfy  both 
assumptions  as  having  no  own  ties.  This  is  satisfied  in  particular  by  the  Hammurabi 
game: the ties are for the suspect, but all occur when he chooses to commit a crime, so 
two distinct own actions are not involved. Notice also that this assumption implies that a 
player playing in the final stage of the game has a unique best choice, and by backwards 
induction, every perfect information game with no own ties has a unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium. 
  We  define  a  profile  as  nearly  pure  if  there  are  no  randomizations  on  the 
equilibrium  path,  and  no  player  except  Nature  randomizes  off  the  equilibrium  path. 
Notice  that  our  proposed  Hammurabi  game  profile  is  nearly  pure  –  only  Nature 
randomizes, and only off the equilibrium path. 
Theorem  6.1:  In  simple  games  with  no  own  ties,  a  subgame-confirmed  Nash   
equilibrium that is nearly pure is path equivalent to a patiently stable state. 
  The proof is in Section 7 below.  Note that in simple games with no own ties, 
players will not randomize on the path of any Nash equilibrium. We do not know whether 
the restriction to nearly pure equilibria is necessary.  In order for a subgame-imperfect 
equilibrium to be patiently stable, players must maintain incorrect beliefs at some parts of 
the  game  tree,  which  requires  bounds  on  the  amount  of  experimentation  at  off-path 
nodes.    We  have  been  unable  to  establish  this  bound  when  there  is  mixing  on  the 
equilibrium  path.  Note  also  that,  although  this  paper  only  considers  the  case  of 
independent beliefs, Theorem 6.1 applies immediately to the more general case where 
correlated beliefs are allowed; difficulties could only arise if priors were restricted to 
have specific types of correlation.     
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The following partial converse to theorem 6.1 will show that patient stability has 
very different implications in the games with and without a river. 
Theorem 6.2: In a simple game, a patiently stable state  q  is a Nash equilibrium in 
weakly undominated strategies. 
Proof: Our  past  work  showed  that  a  patiently  stable  steady  state  must  be  a  Nash 
equilibrium,  so  it  remains  to  show  that  the  steady  state  must  assign  probability  0  to 
weakly dominated strategies. This follows from our maintained assumptions that priors 
are  non-doctrinaire  and  independent.  The  optimal  rule  in  the  agent’s  dynamic 
programming problem will assign probability 0 to an action unless it either (a) maximizes 
the current period’s expected payoff or (b) increases expected payoff in future periods by 
providing information about actions that have a positive probability of being myopically 
optimal.  Non-doctrinaire priors imply that it will never be a myopic best response to play 
a weakly dominated strategy, and in a simple game with independent priors, a weakly 
dominated  strategy  has  no  information  value.  Notice  that  the  theorem  makes  no 
assertions about iterated dominance.
15 
Example 2.3 Continued: The Lightning Game 
In the lightning game, the no-crime profile is a self-confirming equilibrium, since 
the information set for nature at which a crime is committed is not observed.  It is not a 
Nash equilibrium, since the suspect is not playing a best response to Nature’s strategy. 
Hence the lightning profile is not patiently stable.  
 
In the game without the river, the no-crime profile is Nash, but fails any test of 
off-path  rationality  by  the  accuser,  who  finds  it  weakly  dominant  to  lie.  In  the 
Hammurabi game, the no-crime profile is again a Nash equilibrium, and it also passes the 
test of off-path rationality, but the beliefs of the accuser about his off-off-path play are 
incorrect. We will show that the no-crime profile is patiently stable in the Hammurabi 
game, but that the no-crime profile is not patiently stable in the game without the river. 
                                                 
15 We are unaware of a counterexample with correlated priors.  
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Example 2.2 Continued: The Hammurabi Game Without A River 
In the game without the river, profile (exit, truth) is a Nash equilibrium, because 
the accuser is off the path of play and so is willing to tell the truth. However, it is weakly 
dominant to lie, so  (exit, truth) is not patiently stable. The only Nash equilibrium where 
the accuser lies is (crime, lie), so by Theorem 6.2 this is the only patiently stable state,   
Example 2.1 Continued: The Hammurabi Game  
In the Hammurabi game, if the suspect exits, the only subgame that is one step off 
the equilibrium path is the game in which the accuser decides whether or not to lie.  In 
this  subgame,  it  is  self-confirming  for  him  to  tell  the  truth,  believe  he  will  not  be 
punished for telling the truth, and believe that if he were to lie he would be punished 
with probability one. So (exit, truth) is a subgame-confirmed equilibrium, and hence by 
Theorem 6.1, it is patiently stable. Moreover, (exit, truth) and (crime, lie) are the only 
Nash equilibrium outcomes, so the set of patiently stable states is path-equivalent to the 
set of subgame-confirmed equilibria. 
 
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 6.1, we provide a sufficient condition 
for patient stability that endogenizes the restriction to nearly pure strategies. We will say 
that a game has “length at most three” if no path through the tree hits more than three 
information sets.  
Lemma 6.3: In simple games with no own ties, no Nature’s move and length at most 
three, a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium is path equivalent to a subgame-confirmed 
Nash equilibrium in which players play pure strategies. 
Example 3.2 shows the role of the assumption of length at most three. That game has 
length four, and as we saw there is a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibria that is not path 
equivalent to a pure subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium.  Our proof of lemma 6.3 uses 
the following result on self-confirming equilibria in games of length at most two: 
Lemma 6.4: In simple games with no own ties, no Nature’s move and length at most two, 




Proof: Fix a self-confirming equilibrium  p , and let the first player be player 1. Each 
strategy that has positive probability under  p  is a best response to some beliefs about 
other player actions in all other subgames. In particular it is a best response to the beliefs 
that following every other action  1 s  the player  ￿  that follows chooses the action that is 
worst for player 1 in that subgame; call these actions  1 ( ) j s s .  Moreover, because there are 
no own ties, in each subgame that is reached by p , player  ￿ ￿ ￿  plays a pure strategy; 
call these  ( )
*







1 1 1 1
,
( ) ( ),




s s s s





is a Nash equilibrium, so the self-confirming equilibrium p  is path-equivalent to a public 
randomization over pure-strategy  Nash equilibria. 
￿ 
Proof of Lemma 6.3: Fix a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium of a game of length at 
most three.  For each first-player action that has zero probability, specify that play in the 
resulting subgame will be one of the Nash equilibria that is worst for the first player 
moving. These continuation equilibria will be in pure strategies, and because the self-
confirming  equilibrium  specified  for  these  subgames  were  randomizations  over  Nash 
equilibria, picking the worst Nash equilibrium will preserve the first player’s incentives 
not to deviate.  Finally, the assumption of no own ties implies that the first player cannot 
randomize, so the strategies we have constructed are pure.  
￿ 
Lemma 6.3 and Theorem 6.1 yield the following corollary:  
 Theorem 6.5: In simple games with no own ties, no Nature’s move and length at most 
three, a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium is path equivalent to a patiently stable 
state. 
Although the class of simple games with no Nature’s move and length at most 
three  is  quite  special,  it  includes  many  important  games  that  have  been  extensively 
studied  by  experimentalists,  including  the  ultimatum,  best  shot,  chain  store,  peasant- 
dictator, and trust games.   
 
19 
7. Proof of Theorem 6.1 
We will now give the proof of Theorem 6.1.   
Theorem  6.1:  In  simple  games  with  no  own  ties,  a  subgame-confirmed  Nash   
equilibrium that is nearly pure is path equivalent to a patiently stable state. 
Let  ￿ ￿  be a nearly-pure subgame confirmed equilibrium. Define a function on 
states (that is, distributions over strategies) as follows: 
  ( ) 0 1 ( | ) ( | ), ( | ) l q p l q p l q p = ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  
where  0 l  is the maximum of the difference between q  and p ￿ at any information set on 
the path of ￿ ￿ , and  1 l  is the same maximum over information sets one step off the path of 
￿ ￿ .    
Now consider a q  such that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Recall that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is the play 
generated by the optimal dynamic learning rules in the environment defined by ￿  when 
players live ￿  periods, and that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is the associated distribution over histories. In 
outline, our proof of the theorem relies on showing that there are (non-doctrinaire) priors 
such that the maps  :
T f Q® Q  map certain neighborhoods of  ￿ ￿  to themselves, where 
the neighborhoods are defined by the l - metric.  We will conclude that the maps have a 
sequence of fixed points that converge to a suitable limit as T ® ¥ .  This limit need not 
be ￿ ￿ ; we only establish that the limit is path equivalent to it.   
The proof uses a combination of new results specific to simple games and more 
general lemmas about rational learning and the law of large numbers, some of which are 
new and others we take from our previous work.  This section states and proves the 
lemmas  about  simple  games;  the  appendix  collects  all  of  the  more  general  statistical 
lemmas, and gives proofs for the lemmas that are new. 
Turning to the details of the proof, we will measure the distance between two 
beliefs of player i by the distance (in the sup norm) between their expected values, that is 
by the maximum difference in the probabilities assigned to any pure action at any node, 
and we will measure the distance between beliefs and the state ￿  in the same way. 
Since each  ￿ ￿ ￿  is a best response to  ￿ ￿￿
￿ , and there are no own ties, each player’s 
action at each information set on the path of ￿ ￿ is a strict best response to the actual play 
of the other players. Therefore there is an  ￿ ￿ ￿  such that each player’s on-path actions  
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are a strict best response to any  i p-  that is within e  of  ￿ ￿￿
￿ at every information set. In 
addition,  every  player’s  actions  at  nodes  one  step  off  the  path  are  also  a  strict  best 
response  to  some  strictly  positive  beliefs  m ￿   that  support  ￿ ￿   as  subgame  confirmed.  
Moreover, there is such a  m ￿ , and a ￿ ￿ such that for any beliefs within ￿  of ￿ ￿  any action 
that is not an (ex ante) best response to ￿ ￿  has expected payoff relative to those beliefs of 
at least e ￿ lower than that of the best response. 
We say that priors are  , n e -strong for a node  x if fewer than  n observations can  
not make the expected probability of actions at that node differ from ￿ ￿  by  more than e . 
Define
7 2 4 2 / n p e º . We say that priors are strong if they are  , n e -strong at all nodes.   
Since  we  are  free  to  choose  any  non-doctrinaire  priors  in  order  to  prove  the 
lemma, we can specify that the priors come from the Dirichlet family.  Specifically, we 
set    
  ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  
where  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ is a Dirichlet distribution on the actions in  ( ) A x  with prior mean  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
and  “initial  intensity”  ( ) x g .  Thus,  when  n  observations  have  been  acquired  at  x  and 
observed play there corresponds to  ￿￿ ￿ , the posterior mean (i.e. expected play) at x  is the 
mixed strategy  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
 
  The first lemma shows that beliefs about on-path play “are close to” p ￿.  This is 
useful both in showing that most players in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  conform to the path of p ￿ (Lemma 
7.3) and in showing that there is little experimentation off of the path of play (Lemma 
7.5.)   
Lemma  7.1:  If  priors  are  Dirichlet  and  strong,  then  for  all  ￿   such  that 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  with  0 /2 e e < , and all  ￿￿ ￿ , the fraction of agents in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  whose 
beliefs about on-path play are more than e  from ￿ ￿  is no more than  0 /2 e . 
Proof: Since beliefs are independent, player ￿  learns nothing about the on-path play of 
other players at information sets that come after hers in periods in which she deviates 
from ￿ ￿ . Consequently, ￿ ’s beliefs about on-path play at any information set at any date 
￿   are  obtained  by  using  the  ￿ ￿ ￿   observations  of  that  information  set  that  are 
available from periods where she did not deviate.  Since the posterior mean of the agent’s  
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beliefs will be a convex combination of the prior and the sample, and strong priors are 
within ￿  of ￿ ￿ , whenever the sample is within ￿  of ￿ ￿ , the posterior will be within ￿  of 
￿ ￿  as well. From the assumption of strong priors, we know that there is no sample path of 
length less than  n that can make any player  ￿ ’s posterior beliefs about  ￿ ’s play be at 
least  ￿  from p ￿.   It is it is thus sufficient to show that, of the agents with samples of 
length n or more at node x, the fraction whose sample is more than ￿  from ￿ ￿  is no more 
than  0 /2 e .  Since q  is within  ￿ ￿ ￿  of ￿ ￿ , we will show that of the agents with samples 
of length  n or more at node x, the fraction whose sample is more than  ￿ ￿ ￿  from q  is 
no more than  0 /2 e .  This will follow from a version of the law of large numbers.  
Since on-path play of  ￿ ￿  is pure, there is a single terminal node 
* z  to which  ￿ ￿  
assigns probability 1. For each player j who plays on the equilibrium path of p ￿, let  ( ) j z I  
be the indicator function which takes on the value 1 if  ￿  deviated from  ￿ ￿  and 0 if  ￿  
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7 2 4 2 / n p e º , we have 
 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
So, regardless of ￿ , at most  0 /3 e  of the agents can have samples of length  n or more  
that differ from q  at information sets on the equilibrium path by at least  /2 e . 
￿ 
Next we want to argue that players on the path of play are unlikely to have beliefs 
about off-path play that make them want to deviate. If player ￿ plays on the path of  ￿ ￿  
and ￿  is an deviation for player ￿ from the path of  ￿ ￿ , we say that a player’s beliefs are 
￿ ￿ ￿ off-path deviation inducing if there exists a strategy profile  i p- ￿  for the opponents 
that is within e  of ￿ ￿  at on-path information sets such the strategy corresponding to  i p- ￿  
at on-path information sets, and the strategy  
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   
generated by the player’s actual beliefs about play at off-path nodes, imply a loss of no 
more than  ￿ from playing  ￿ rather than the path of  ￿ ￿ . Note that in simple games, a  
player’s beliefs about play following some other deviation  ' a  are irrelevant for whether 
the beliefs are  ￿ ￿ ￿ off-path deviation inducing, as are the player’s beliefs about play at 
successors of a  to which the player assigns sufficiently  low probability. 
Lemma 7.2:   Suppose that all agents have priors that are Dirichlet and strong. For any 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and any state ￿  with   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , any prior and any ￿, as ￿ ￿ ￿ the fraction of 
agents in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  who play ￿ and have beliefs that are  ￿ ￿ ￿ off-path deviation-inducing 
goes to ￿. 
Proof:  In outline, we will show that for any  ' 0 e > the fraction of agents in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  who 
play ￿  and have beliefs are  ￿ ￿ ￿ off-path deviation-inducing is no larger than  ￿ ￿ .  This 
will follow from the fact that the true state ￿  is not off-path deviation-inducing and the 
strong law of large numbers  
To  make  this  precise,  let  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   be  the  set  of  nodes  that  have  positive 
probability when player ￿ plays ￿ and the distribution of other player’s play is given by 
￿ ￿￿ . Let. ￿   be the node where a  is feasible.  Define  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  to be the frequency with 
which  ￿   has  been  played  when  ￿   has  been  reached.  Let  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   be  the  behavior  
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strategy corresponding to ￿  according to Kuhn’s Theorem. Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the number 
of times ￿  has been hit given the sample  ￿ ￿ .  
Now consider the information that player i has about play at successors of action 
a.  Lemma  A.2  shows  that  for  all  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   there  is  an  N  such  that  for  all 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
That is, at any node  ' x , only a few players (a) have seen that node be reached many times 
and (b) have observations that are substantially different from ￿ . Moreover, the share of 
such players can be made small by taking N sufficiently large. In particular, this is true at 
every node that is one step off of the equilibrium path, and every feasible action  ￿ ￿  at 
such information sets.  From that same lemma, for each node  ￿ ￿ , and any N and  ' e , there 
is an  ' N  such that the fraction of players who have played  ￿ ￿  more than  ' N  times and 
seen x fewer than N times is less than  ' e . Since X  is finite, for any  N  and  ' e , there is an 
' N  such the fraction of players who have played  ￿ ￿  more than  ' N  times and seen any 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   fewer than N  times  is less than  ' /3 e . 
Now fix an  ￿ ￿  and the corresponding N¸ ' N , and divide the population of player 
i’s into two categories: those who have played a more than  ' N  times, and those who 
have not. Then by the preceding arguments there is an  " N  such that of those who have 
played a more than  ' N  times, no more than  ' /3 e  have fewer than  " N  observations on 
any  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ,  while  of  those  who  have  more  than  " N   observations  on  all 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ , at most  ' /3 e  have samples that differ from  ￿ ￿￿  by more than  ' e .  Since 
priors are strong, these players’ beliefs at  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  are within  1 max{ ' , } e e e <  of  ˆ m . 
Since  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  are the nodes reached with positive probability at  ￿ ￿￿  when ￿ is played, 
beliefs at other reachable nodes given ￿ are equal to the prior, that is ￿ ￿ .
17 By definition 
of  ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿ it follows that  ￿ has an expected loss of at least  ￿ ￿. Since  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ these 
players’ beliefs are not  , a e  off-path deviation inducing. 
   To handle the histories where  a has been played fewer than  ' N  times, note that 
the fraction of the population that plays ￿  and has done so no more than  ' N times must  
go to zero as ￿ ￿ ￿, and so is eventually smaller than  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . So the total fraction of 
                                                 
17 We do not need the full strength of this assumption, as beliefs two-steps off the equilibrium path can be 
shown not to matter, but proving this requires additional argument. As we are free to pick the prior, we 
chose it to make the proof as easy as possible.  
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players whose beliefs are  , a e  off-path deviation-inducing is no more than  ' e , and goes 
to 0 as T ® ¥ . 
￿ 
  Using lemmas 7.1 and 7.2, we can conclude there are few deviations from the 
path of p ￿. 
Lemma 7.3: Suppose that all agents have priors that are Dirichlet and strong. For any 
￿ ￿  there is a ￿  so that in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  the fraction of players who deviate at a node on the 
path of p ￿ is no greater than  ￿ ￿ .  
Proof:  A player who deviates at an on-path node either (i) does not play an ￿-static best-
response to beliefs, (ii) has beliefs that are  ￿ ￿ ￿-off-path deviation inducing for some ￿ , 
or (iii) has beliefs that are wrong by more than  ￿  about on-path play. The first class of 
agents goes to 0 with T  by Lemma A.4, since p ￿ is a strict equilibrium.
18  The second 
class goes to 0 with T from lemma 7.2, and the third class is no more than  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  from 
lemma 7.1.   
￿ 
 
Next we want to argue that play must be close to p ￿ at nodes one step off of the 
equilibrium path, To do so, we first bound beliefs about play at those nodes. 
Lemma 7.4: For all  1 e , there exists an  N  such that if priors are Dirichlet and  1 ,2 N e -
strong  at  all  nodes  one  step-off  the  path  of  ￿ ￿ ,  then  for  all  0 , q e   such  that 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and all  ￿￿ ￿ , the fraction of agents in  ( )
T f q  whose beliefs about 
one-step-off-path play are more than  1 2e   from ￿ ￿  is no more than  1/2 e . 
Proof: Denote by 
1 f e 2  the fraction of agents in  ( )
T f q  whose beliefs about one-step-off-
path play are more than  1 2e  from  ￿ ￿ . To bound
1 f e 2 , recall that for any  ' e  lemma A.2 
yields an  N  such that fewer than  1/4 e  players have seen a node more than N times and 
have a sample of play at that node that differs from the q  by more than  ' e . Since the 
prior about this node is concentrated near p ￿, and q  is within  1 e  of p ￿ at this nodes, by 
choosing  ' e  sufficiently small, these players have beliefs that are within  1 2e  of  ￿ ￿  at 
those nodes. On the other hand, because we have assumed that priors are  1 ,2 N e -strong 
                                                 
18 In addition to the strong law, lemma A.4 relies on the fact that the posterior distribution converges to the 
empirical c.d.f. at a uniform rate, as shown by Diaconis and Freedman [1990].  
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one-step-off the path, players who have seen the node fewer than N times have beliefs 
that are within  1 2e  of ￿ ￿  at those nodes. 
￿ 
  Finally we use lemmas 7.1 and 7.4 to conclude that most players one step off the 
path of play a best response to their priors.  
Lemma 7.5: Let  1 /2 e e £  and let  m ￿  be Dirichlet priors that support p ￿ as subgame-
confirmed.  For any  1 e  there exists  N  such that if  m ￿  is  strong and is also  1 ,2 N e -strong 
one  step-off  the  path  of  ˆ p ,  then  for  all  d   there  is  an  0 e   such  that  if    q   satisfies 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , then in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ the fraction of players who fail to play a best response 
to their priors is less than  1/2 e . 
Proof: The actual probability of being off the path of p ￿ goes to zero as  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  and 
Lemma 7.1 shows that as  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  the fraction of the population who ever believes that 
the probability of being off the path is large must be small.  By lemma A.5, a player who 
believes  that  the  chance  of  being  at  a  node  is  small  relative  to 
2 (1 ) d -   will  not 
experiment at that node, so as  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  most players play a best response to their beliefs 
whenever they are at nodes that are off the path of play. Lemma 7.4 shows that most  
players have beliefs about one-step-off-path play less than  1 2e e <  from  ￿ ￿ ; since they 
have never experimented, their best response to their beliefs is a best response to their 
priors.  
￿ 
Proof of Theorem 6.1: We show that p ￿ is a path equivalent to a patiently stable state. (A 
patiently stable state is a limit first as T ® ¥  then as  1 d ®  of the steady state path of 
play.)  Recall  that  we  have  fixed  ,n e .  Fix  1 /2 e e £ .  We  may  then  choose  N   
independent of  T   so that for any d  there is an  0 e  such that Lemma 7.5 holds with the 
fraction failing to play a best-response to their priors no greater than  1 e . Fix a prior  m ￿  
that supports p ￿ as subgame confirmed, that is strong (relative to  , n e ) and is also  1 , N e 2 -
strong one-step off the path. We will keep this prior fixed as we vary  ,T d . Fix d . Since 
by Lemma 7.5 the fraction failing to play a best-response to their priors one-step off path 
is no greater than  1 e , and  m ￿  supports p ￿ as subgame-confirmed, this implies that all but 
1 e  play according to p ￿ one-step off the path, that is  1 1 ˆ ( ( )| ) f l q p e £ . By choosing  T  
large enough we can conclude from Lemma 7.3 that  0 0 ˆ ( ( )| ) f l q p e £ . Hence there is a  
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fixed point, that is, steady state, with a path within  0 e  of p ￿. Since  0 e  can be arbitrarily 
small, this implies that the limit for each d  as T ® ¥  is path equivalent to p ￿. As this 
remains true for the limit as  1 d ® , this completes the proof. 
￿ 
8. Conclusion 
We have shown that a patiently stable state must be path-equivalent to a Nash  
equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies, and that in games with no own ties, a 
subgame-confirmed  equilibrium  is  path  equivalent  to  a  patiently  stable  state  if  the 
equilibrium is near pure or if the game has length at most three.  These results lead to 
sharp predictions in some games of interest, such as the Hammurabi, ultimatum, best- 
shot, peasant- dictator, and trust games.  
We are working on an extension of our analysis to the more general class of 
“games  with  identified  deviators.”  We  conjecture  that  in  these  games  only  subgame-
confirmed  equilibria  can  be  patiently  stable.  When  combined  with  the  results  of  this 
paper,  the  conjecture  would  imply  that  patient  stability  is  essentially  equivalent  to 
subgame-confirmed equilibrium in the games we studied here.  However, the result that 
every  subgame-confirmed  equilibrium  is  equivalent  to  a  patiently  stable  state  seems 
unlikely to generalize, which leaves open the question of determining a more restrictive 
necessary condition. 
To  conclude  it  may  be  helpful  to  relate  our  analysis  to  past  work.  Nash 
equilibrium  is  “as  if”  players  know  the  equilibrium  path  and  the  consequences  of 
unilateral deviations from the equilibrium path. This is why learning in an extensive form 
need not in general lead to Nash equilibrium: to rule out Nash equilibria, players must 
have  “enough”  observations  of  off-path  play  to  learn  the  consequences  of  deviating. 
Equilibrium refinements such as subgame-perfect equilibrium are “as if” players know 
play throughout the entire game tree.  This requires  “enough” observations of play at 
most information sets, not just those that can be reached by a single deviation.  Thus the 
two  key issues for learning in extensive form games are (1) How  much off-path play is 




Most work in this area has followed Fudenberg and Kreps [1988], [1995], [1996] 
in treating the frequency and timing of off-path “experiments” as exogenous.  Fudenberg 
and Kreps worked with a model of boundedly rational learning in the style of fictitious 
play, and developed various assumptions that ensured that every node one step off the 
path of play is reached infinitely often. This is similar in spirit to the work of Jehiel and 
Samet [2004] on the convergence of boundedly rational learning in games of perfect 
information,  as  they  too  assume  that  there  is  an  exogenous  probability  of 
experimentation. In Noldeke and Samuelson [1993], off-path play occurs as the result of 
an exogenous “mutation” that leads an agent to use another strategy; this serves as an 
“experiment” from the viewpoint of the population because all agents get to observe the 
result of the mutants play.   
The present paper, like our [1993b] work, differs in deriving the experimentation 
rule from the solution to the agent’s optimal decision. It is clear that impatient agents 
need not experiment at all, so we have focused on the play of very patient agents. The 
main force driving our results is that even patient agents need not experiment at nodes 
that are off of the path of play; this is why all subgame-confirmed equilibria are patiently 
stable. Other explanations for experimentation will lead to other equilibrium refinements; 
the advantage of the optimization assumption is that it provides some guidance on the 
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Proof: We derive specific bounds based on the method of proof of the strong law of large 














1 4 Pr(max ) Pr( >  or  ... or  ) Pr( )
n n
n
n n n n n n n n
n n n n
ES




> = > > £ > £ ￿ ￿ . 
 












and in the binomial case  ￿ ￿ ￿
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Finally, to estimate the sum, when  ￿ ￿ ￿  it is equal to  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  where z  is the 
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- ￿ ￿ , 
which gives the desired result. 
                                                 
19  The lemma is stated for the case of binomial random variables, where its strength is proportional to the 
mean  ￿ , but it is true more generally. The key requirement for this “strong law of small numbers” is that 




Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . Define  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  to be the frequency with which ￿  has been played when 
￿  has been reached. Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the behavior strategy profile corresponding to  ￿ ￿  
according to Kuhn’s Theorem, and let  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  be marginal derived from  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
given an  ￿ ￿  such that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the number of times  ￿  has been hit 
given the sample  ￿ ￿ , and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the number of times  ￿ ￿  has been played. 
Lemma  A.2  For  all  , ' 0 e e >   there  is  an  0 N >   for  all 
, , , , ( ), , ( ), , i i j T r i a A x s x X s x X j i q Î Î Î ¹  
(A.2.1)   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
(A.2.2)   ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
 
References: Fudenberg and Levine [1993b] Lemma B.2 and/or Fudenberg and Levine 




i r  be optimal rules when life is ￿  periods, and let  ￿
￿ ￿  be optimal rules when  ￿  
periods of life remain. 
Lemma A.3:   If  ( ) i i s q >0, then 
  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Reference: Fudenberg and Levine  [1993b] Lemma 5.7 and/or Fudenberg and Levine 
[2004] Lemma C.4.  
 
We define the event  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  to be those  ￿ ￿  such that  max ( ) ( ( ) )
i
k
s i i i i i i i u s y u r y y e £ + .  
That is,  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is the set of histories for player i such that  ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is an ￿-best-response to 
the marginal beliefs at  ￿ ￿ . 
Lemma A.4: For all  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿ ￿  there is an ￿  such that for all  ￿￿ ￿  such that 
  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ . 
Reference:  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [1993b]  proof  of  Theorem  6.1  and  Fudenberg  and 
Levine [2004] Lemma D.1.  The intuition for this result is that if node x has been reached  
 
30 
many times, the “option value” of experimenting here is likely to be low, so that with 
high probability the optimal rule must prescribe an e -best response.
20 Thus, only a few 
players can be playing an action  ( )
k
i i i a r y =  that they have already played more than N 
times and which is not an ￿-best-response to their beliefs. 
Lemma A.5 : With  independent priors,  
  ￿  
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
Proof:  Set  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ .  By  assumption  ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   yields 
information that will only be of value only if x is reached again. The greatest value the 
information could have at that time is ￿ . Let  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  where  ￿ ￿  means that x was 
not  reached  during  the  previous  ￿   periods.  Then
  ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 
Notice  that  ￿ ￿   is  non-increasing  in  t:  failing  to  reach  ￿   must  lower  the  posterior 
probability that it will be reached in the future. So in particular 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . 
Note  that  only  ￿ ￿   is  relevant;  how  strongly  held  the  belief  is  not.  Also 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , which gives the result. 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 
                                                 
20  One might expect that we could take  ' e  to be 0 by taking N sufficiently large, and indeed this is 
possible in standard bandit problems.  However, as we explained in our earlier work, the fact that players 
know the structure of the game tree means that in some games there can be large but “unrepresentative” 
samples for which the value of further experimenting is still high.  We conjecture that these samples cannot 
occur in simple games, so that we could indeed set  ' 0 e =  for the purposes of this paper, but it is easier to 
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